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 $ (billions)
Medicaid and CHIP 434
Exchange Subsidies and Related Spending 464
Small Employer Tax Credit 40
Gross Cost of Coverage Provisions 938
Penalties on Uninsured Individuals and Employers (69)
Excise Tax on High Cost Insurance Plans (32)               
Other (48)               
Net Cost of Coverage Provisions 788
Medicare Payment Reductions and Other Changes (511)
Increases in Revenues (420)
Deficit Reduction (143)
Source: The Congressional Budget Office, Letter to the Honorable Nancy Pelosi providing 
estimates of the spending and revenue effects of the reconciliation proposal, March 20, 2010.
Federal Spending and Revenues in Health Reform, 2010 - 2019
The ultimate effect of reform on the nation’s debt level is 
uncertain, but policymakers retain a wide range of tools to 
contain costs if CBO estimates prove too optimistic. 
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The Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (PPACA) expands coverage 
to over 30 million uninsured 
Americans through Medicaid 
expansions and tax credits. Reduced 
Medicare payments to providers will 
partially offset the new spending. The 
rest will be offset by revenues from an 
excise tax on high-cost health plans, 
increased payroll taxes on earned and 
unearned income, taxes on insurers 
and drug and medical device 
manufacturers, penalties on uninsured 
individuals, and assessments on 
medium and large employers whose 
employees obtain subsidies through 
the exchanges.  
The Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) projects that health reform will 
reduce the deficit over the first 10 
years (2010–2019) and will continue 
to do so in the following decade. The 
CBO estimates that the deficit will 
decline by $143 billion over the first 
10 years and, beginning in 2020, by 
0.5 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) each year, on average.
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Relative to 2010 GDP, this would 
amount to about $75 billion a year. 
Over the 10-year period beginning in 
2020, the health reform will, as 
projected by CBO, result in 
cumulative deficit reduction of about 
$1.5 trillion.  
As shown in the table below,
2
 the 
CBO estimates that new spending 
from the Medicaid expansion will cost 
$434 billion over the 2010–19 period. 
Subsidies to individuals and families 
and to small firms will amount to 
$464 billion and $40 billion, 
respectively. Penalties on uninsured 
individuals and employers and the 
excise tax on high-cost plans will 
provide about $150 billion in offsets. 
Cuts in Medicare and Medicaid (and 
some other provisions) will amount to 
$511 billion. Various new taxes on 
earned and unearned income, drug 
and medical device manufacturers, 
and insurers will generate revenue of 
an additional $420 billion. This 
accounts for the projected $143 billion 
in deficit reduction between 2010 and 
2019. One could argue that if 
Congress just enacted the Medicare 
cuts without expanding coverage, 
there would be much more deficit 
reduction, but the affected providers 
would have opposed the payment 
reductions much more vigorously if 
there were to be no increase in 
coverage which will increase their 
revenues and reduce uncompensated 
care costs.  
Beginning in 2019, the law will 
change the indexing of subsidies so 
that they will grow more slowly than 
they will in the preceding years. This 
will reduce the projected cost of these 
subsidies to government, and shift 
more costs to individuals and families 
(with the possibility that more people 
will be exempted from the 
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requirement to obtain coverage). In 
addition, the premium threshold above 
which the excise tax would be 
imposed on health insurance 
premiums will be indexed to general 
inflation rather than to 1 percentage 
point above inflation, as it is in 2018 
and 2019. This provision will increase 
taxes obtained from the excise tax, or 
if individuals cut back on the 
comprehensiveness of their employer-
based coverage, they should have 
higher wages and salaries than 
otherwise and thus pay higher income 
and payroll taxes, which will bring in 
more revenue. In either case, the 
effect will be to reduce the deficit.  
Did the CBO Get the 
Estimates Right, or Was It 
Too Optimistic?  
Supporters and opponents of health 
reform have both spent significant 
time projecting the impact of reform 
on the nation’s bottom line—not 
surprisingly, with divergent views. No 
one can quantify precisely what the 
financial effect of health reform will 
be over time. Making estimates of 
expenditures and revenues is 
inherently difficult, and there are 
several uncertainties regarding the 
estimates. The CBO may have been 
optimistic in its assumptions but 
probably not significantly so. It 
projects a baseline of uninsured of 54 
million in 2019,
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 assuming that the 
number of uninsured does not increase 
substantially relative to current levels. 
In our calculations of coverage 
changes over the next decade, we 
estimate 57 million uninsured in 2019 
in the best case, and 65 million in the 
worst case.
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 If the CBO has been too 
optimistic on the future number of 
uninsured absent reform, they may 
have underestimated the number of 
individuals who would qualify for and 
need Medicaid or subsidies in order to 
obtain health insurance. Therefore, 
there may be more individuals signing 
up for Medicaid or subsidies than 
CBO originally estimated. The CBO 
also seems to have assumed a low 
take-up rate in Medicaid because 
penalties for nonenrollment will not 
generally be imposed on people at 
Medicaid-eligible income levels. 
However, the actual outcome with 
strong outreach efforts by advocacy 
groups and providers could be greater 
Medicaid enrollment than the CBO 
projects.
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 But significant uncertainty 
remains, and fewer people may sign 
up for either Medicaid or for subsidies 
compared with CBO predictions. For 
example, there could be difficulties in 
developing outreach efforts and 
encouraging enrollment in states 
where there is widespread opposition 
to the law.  
Another uncertainty is that the law has 
assumed that the cuts in Medicare 
payments to hospitals, hospices, 
nursing homes, and home health 
agencies, with payment increases 
below the rate of inflation, can be 
sustained. The assumption is that 
there will be ongoing ―productivity 
improvements‖ in the delivery of 
health care that will then be returned 
to the taxpayer. To the extent that 
providers are successful at lobbying 
for legislation that reduces cuts of this 
magnitude, the savings will be 
reduced and the deficit will be higher 
than projected. Similar cuts in 
Medicare provider payments have 
been suggested by both the Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission and 
the CBO.
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 It is quite likely that these 
cuts would have been proposed as part 
of a deficit reduction package in the 
absence of health reform. The real 
question is whether Medicare can pay 
less than the rate of growth in input 
prices over a decade or, as actuaries at 
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services suggest, such reductions are 
not sustainable.
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 They may be 
particularly hard to sustain without 
serious adverse effects on program 
beneficiaries if there are not similar 
controls on the rest of the health care 
system. 
Another issue is that private premiums 
may increase faster than the CBO 
assumes. Health care costs, and thus 
premiums, could grow faster for 
several reasons, including the 
consolidation in both insurer and 
provider markets that has occurred 
over the past several years. If 
premiums increase faster than 
projected, then subsidy costs will be 
higher. The reform ties government 
subsidies to the difference between 
premiums for the second lowest cost 
―silver plan‖ (exchanges will offer 
bronze, silver, gold, and platinum 
plans, each being increasingly 
comprehensive) and the percentage of 
family income as established by the 
subsidy schedule. To the extent that 
the silver plans (as well as others) cost 
more than projected by CBO, 
government subsidy costs will be 
higher since the government is 
responsible for the difference. But 
premiums could also grow more 
slowly than expected due to 
increasing competition, greater 
transparency and ability to price 
compare, removal of the least efficient 
carriers along with the underwriting, 
lower administrative costs in 
exchange plans, etc.  
The reductions in subsidies and 
increases in the excise tax in 2019 and 
thereafter may also be difficult to 
sustain. The threshold at which 
premiums will be subject to the excise 
tax will increase by the rate of 
inflation, which will mean more and 
more people will be subject to this tax 
if, as expected, premiums continue to 
grow faster than inflation. This could 
result in increased political opposition 
and a change in the indexing method. 
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The indexing of the income-related 
subsidies makes them less generous 
relative to the cost of insurance over 
time. This also may not be 
sustainable, because it could result in 
insurance becoming unaffordable over 
time for larger numbers of low-and 
moderate-income Americans. There 
may be pressure to maintain the 
generosity of these subsidies to ensure 
low uninsurance rates. If these 
indexing provisions are not 
sustainable and additional federal 
financing is devoted to them, this 
would affect the costs of the PPACA 
beyond 2020.  
On the other hand, the law also 
contains several cost-containment 
initiatives involving accountable 
health care organizations, medical 
homes for the chronically ill, episode-
based payment, medical malpractice 
demonstrations, comparative 
effectiveness research, and prevention 
measures. There is increasing 
evidence that medical homes can 
generate savings for the chronically 
ill.
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 And while generalized prevention 
efforts seem ineffective, more targeted 
efforts offer more promise.
9
 The CBO 
does not assume cost savings from 
any of these measures due to a lack of 
solid evidence on their effects. To the 
extent that these efforts do yield 
savings, the CBO may have 
significantly overestimated the cost of 
reform and underestimated the 
amount of deficit reduction. 
Further, the law establishes a new 
office within the Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services to improve 
care management for the very costly 
dual eligibles, including improving 
coordination between Medicare and 
Medicaid. Dual eligibles, about 10 
million individuals, will account for 
over $300 billion in 2010, or about 14 
percent of U.S. health care spending.
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Saving even a small percent on this 
group can yield substantial amounts. 
The new health insurance exchanges 
include a managed competition 
framework in which individuals, even 
those with subsidies, will have to pay 
higher out-of-pocket costs for more 
comprehensive coverage. This, along 
with the incentives the excise tax 
creates, should also encourage more 
cost consciousness and less growth in 
health care costs.  
If the CBO’s estimates are not 
accurate, the government can take 
steps to reduce the effect of reform on 
the deficit. The fact that government 
is responsible for the cost of 
Medicare, an expanded Medicaid 
program, and income-related 
subsidies for large numbers of low- 
and moderate-income Americans 
means that it has a much greater 
responsibility for health care cost 
containment than it has had 
historically. Thus, the government 
would likely take strong steps to 
restrain the growth in insurance 
premiums and health care costs if 
necessary. Steps that became 
politically untenable during the health 
reform debate in the past year—such 
as greater systemwide cost controls, a 
public plan trigger, medical 
malpractice reform, a stronger cap on 
the tax exclusion of employer health 
insurance contributions, and other 
options—could become politically 
feasible.  
Conclusion  
The CBO has estimated that health 
reform will reduce the deficit 
primarily because cuts in Medicare 
combined with new revenues will 
more than offset new spending, and 
that the deficit reduction effects will 
increase over time. The CBO 
projections may have underestimated 
spending growth but probably not in 
any significant way. There is some 
chance that the cost of Medicaid 
expansion and subsidies to individuals 
and families could be higher than 
expected. Some of the indexing 
provisions that begin in 2019 may be 
difficult to sustain. Similarly, the cuts 
in Medicare also may be difficult to 
sustain over the long-term. On the 
other hand, the CBO may have 
underestimated the effectiveness of 
the many cost-containment provisions 
in the bill—the increased competition 
within exchanges, the taxes on high-
cost health plans, and such cost-
containment initiatives as accountable 
health organizations, medical homes 
for the chronically ill, comparative 
effectiveness research, and many 
prevention measures. There will also 
be a major new effort to improve the 
management of care for dual eligibles. 
There are many other ways the 
government could strengthen cost-
containment provisions if CBO 
estimates prove too optimistic.  
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